A Once Distant War Now Shakes Saudi Arabia

In Saudi Arabia, the war against the Houthis has been brought home. In early October, Houthi rebels bombed Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport in the biggest disruption to civil life in Saudi Arabia in years. According to Al Jazeera, 12 were killed and over 300 were injured, with over half of the fatalities being foreign nationals. While Saudi Arabia’s war with the Houthis in Yemen has been going on for years, it did not affect the daily lives of most Saudi citizens until civilian infrastructure and key economic sites became targets.

The shift began in July when the Houthis broke a relatively peaceful four-year stretch with Saudi Arabia by attacking Abha International Airport. Fighting ensued between the two for the rest of the summer and Arab officials accused the Houthis of injuring 73 civilians during a flurry of September 8 strikes across southern Saudi Arabia. In early October, Riyadh’s airport was struck three times within the span of a week –– the deadliest attacks on civilian populations in the country  in a decade.

Attacks on Saudi cities means foreigners are temporarily leaving the kingdom. Air France-KLM suspended service to Riyadh until the end of October, and several embassies are encouraging citizens to avoid travelling there. Beyond air travel, Saudi Arabia’s increasingly diversified economy is suffering from these attacks. On October 13 a Houthi missile struck and damaged the top floors of the Aramco headquarters, the  state oil company. The finance ministry has raised its 2026 deficit forecast by 48% to 245 billion riyals, mostly to fund Vision 2030 programs while the regional war slows the economy. Sports diplomacy, one of Saudi Arabia’s strategies for diversifying its economy and global notoriety, has also taken a hit with an international tennis tournament postponed to December and its Formula 1 race in Jeddah cancelled in April due to the wider Iran war.

None of this means Saudis have suffered more than Yemenis since the conflict began in 2015. The UN has said the fighting is causing food aid cuts for 800,000 Yemeni people. From losing civilians in a domestic attack to threats that cut deeply into Saudi Arabia’s economy, the nation is only now beginning to feel the effects of this war at home.

By Walter Giesen ’30

Posted on October 26, 2026

European Trade Deficits and China’s FOREX Dilemma

This past June, European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde prompted discussions around the undervaluation of the Chinese Yuan. This isn’t a new issue, as negative European sentiment against Chinese FOREX policy stretches back to July 2025, with the German Economic Institute accusing China of accelerating European Deindustrialization by making the yuan a draw to cheaper Chinese manufacturing. However, even if the yuan is undervalued by 25-30%, according to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, that undervaluation compounds against something Beijing wants even more: making the yuan a trusted store of value.

On October 8, 2026, The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) responded to the European accusation. One of their main defenses was their move away from foreign exchange intervention in 2017, a practice that is consistent with Beijing’s goal of making the Yuan a trusted store of value. In PBoC’s 5-year plan, they outline the goal for internationalizing the yuan, which requires the prioritization of the yuan to be a trusted currency in FOREX Markets. The main accusation levied against China is the undervaluing of their currency.  This requires currency outflow, which is done through importing goods or investing in foreign countries. This naturally creates a trade deficit or simply large capital outflows. If China is indeed undervaluing the yuan, it would make international firms more attracted to invest in China, creating a trade surplus or capital inflows. In other words, it would have the opposite effect of promoting trust in the Yuan.

However, a sharp-eyed critic can point out that countries in surplus have strong reserve currencies, namely Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. What distinguishes these currencies from the yuan is their ability to be recycled in a market. Despite having high surpluses, these currencies are still invested abroad. Uniquely, the yuan is not invested abroad even after the trade surpluses and the investments China receives from other countries. Thereby, it’s more accurate to say that the convertibility of the Chinese yuan directly affects its trust as a currency, with the undervaluing of it aggravating the issue.

By Syon Kaustuv ’30

Posted on October 26, 2026

Don’t Look Back in Anger: Andy Burnham’s Vision for Britain

In “No Surprises,” Radiohead captures the exhaustion of a life spent working, waiting and expecting nothing better, trapped in perpetual unhappiness. It could almost be a soundtrack to modern Britain. After decades of Thatcherite neoliberalism, Blairite acquiescence and Conservative austerity, Britons have been told to accept declining public services and diminished expectations.

Andy Burnham’s historic Labour conference speech rejected this defeatism.

His argument was fundamentally social democratic. Housing, water, energy and public transport should serve the people who depend on them, not shareholders. His plans for greater public control challenge Thatcher’s market fundamentalism. His proposed National Care Service revives the principle behind the NHS that dignity in old age is a right, not a privilege reserved for those who can afford it.

Fourteen years of Conservative rule starved councils of funding and left public services crumbling. Yet Starmer’s Labour seemed almost afraid of its own traditions. How could the party of the NHS, born of a country that gave the world trade unions and the cooperative movement, be so afraid of defending public ownership?

Burnham’s most moving moments concerned his father, Roy. He recalled the post-war Britain that gave working-class families like his opportunities denied to earlier generations. Roy, who passed away due to Alzheimer’s disease, had voted for Labour governments that opened university doors to his sons. Burnham also spoke of the care workers who looked after him with extraordinary compassion despite their poverty wages. His vision of a fairer Britain felt like a debt owed to his father’s generation.

Of course, promises require funding, and Burnham will face difficult choices. But Britain cannot keep pleading poverty whenever ordinary people ask for a better life.

Perhaps Andy Burnham is more than a pair of eyelashes and a black T-shirt after all.

Britain cannot undo forty years of political choices overnight. Yet it need not remain imprisoned by them. Perhaps another Manchester band, Oasis, offers the better message for Burnham’s Britain. Don’t look back in anger, at least not today. Look forward. Hope. Again.

By Utku Özgür ’29, Managing Editor

Posted on October 26, 2026

Is Climate Capitalism the Future of Decarbonization?

Although capitalism has driven industrialization and fossil fuel reliance, it may also drive decarbonization through market incentives. Capitalist growth fueled the Industrial Revolution but created environmental degradation and accelerated global warming. Can the same market forces that established climate change solve it?

Climate capitalism uses profit incentives, private investments, and market forces to make climate-friendly solutions economically competitive. Private investment can expand clean technology supply, while policy and consumer demand make it economically viable to do so. This dynamic is exemplified in the solar power and electric vehicle markets. As these environmental markets expand, firms face increasing financial incentives to enter them.

Carbon pricing is the most visible example of globally adopted climate capitalism. According to the World Bank Group’s (WBG) State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026 report, direct carbon pricing covers 29 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Direct carbon pricing makes greenhouse gas emissions more expensive for businesses.  The WBG identified 87 direct carbon pricing policies implemented across 47 countries; India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) and Japan’s GX-ETS system are among the most recent. The global expansion suggests that governments are increasingly relying on market incentives. The question is whether market mechanisms can induce the structural change required for deep decarbonization.

Climate capitalism has equity and accountability limitations. Firms respond primarily to profit, weakening climate commitments when green investment becomes less financially attractive. Such profit incentives promote greenwashing, where firms create an environmentally friendly image without initiating measurable emission reductions. Wealthy countries and firms are better positioned to finance clean technologies and capture green industry benefits, deepening inequity. While climate policy is not sufficient, it may be politically necessary. Policymakers should combine market mechanisms with government regulations such as emission limits and phase-outs of fossil fuel subsidies to ensure meaningful progress in deep decarbonization.

By Maya Macias ’29

Posted on October 26, 2026

The Taiwan Question and the Race for AI

On October 14, the IMF increased its prediction of Taiwan’s GDP growth to 10.7%, making it the only country in the region expected to grow in the double digits this year. The Taiwanese Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is one of the primary sources of this growth, as it continues to play an outsized role in the global AI race. The IMF’s projection, combined with the fact that most of the world’s AI chips are manufactured on one of TSMC’s foundation lines, makes it clear that Taiwan is the world’s chokepoint for advanced AI chipmaking for the foreseeable future.

The chipmaking dominance represented by Taiwan’s rapid growth directly impacts the U.S., tying the Taiwanese question with the AI race. Losing Taiwan to China would be catastrophic for leading American AI companies and give Chinese companies direct access to cutting-edge foundries. The challenge to Taiwanese sovereignty is now a threat to America’s ability to out-innovate China and other adversaries. Whereas China intends to build its AI industry without relying onTaiwanese companies, the U.S. lead in the AI race is wholly dependent on its partnership with TSMC. Efforts to diversify TSMC’s locations to Japan, America, and Germany are years away from producing at the efficiency of Taiwanese factories. Taiwan, already essential to American interests in the region, has only increased in importance from a U.S. foreign policy perspective. With that value showing no signs of waning, the White House’s strategy of decoupling from Taiwan’s dominance by insourcing semiconductor industries onto U.S. shores leaves much to be desired. Any threat to Taiwan is a threat to American innovation and national security.

By Holden Tsai ’27

Posted on October 26, 2026

Zero Accountability: Two Ways Israel Gets Away With Torture and Sexual Violence Against Palestinians

In 1992 the Inspector for Interrogatee Complaints against General Security Service (GSS) interrogators was created. The GSS is the Israeli body primarily responsible for interrogating suspected security threats, which are almost always Palestinian. The responsibility of the Inspector is to review complaints made by interrogatees against GSS officials and make recommendations on whether to proceed with criminal investigations to the State Attorney’s Office. Despite over a thousand complaints made over multiple decades, nearly all of them have remained uninvestigated. Many of these complaints include likely credible accounts of torture and sexual violence given their large quantity and what has become a plethora of publicly available evidence of Israeli abuse against Palestinans in detention. For example, footage of five Israeli soldiers who, on July 5, 2024, at Sde Teiman prison, can be seen raping a male Palestinian detainee with a sharp object, resulting in broken ribs, a punctured lung, and internal rectal tears. All five walk free, hailed as “heroic fighters” by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Two mechanisms that allow the GSS to get away with similar acts of torture and sexual violence through uninvestigated complaints are (1) a structural lack of evidence and (2) the “necessity” defense.

Section 17 of the Criminal Procedure Law of 1996 reads, “Documentation of an interrogation of a suspect by audio or visual means shall not apply to the interrogation of a suspect in a security offense.” This makes it nearly impossible for interrogatees to substantiate acts of torture and sexual violence during interrogations because they have no evidence to support their claims against GSS interrogators, allowing for continued abuse with impunity.

The Israeli Supreme Court in Hamdan v. General Security Service (1996) and Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel (1999) authorized GSS interrogators to use “physical pressure,” which includes methods of torture and sexual violence, when necessary. The Attorney General routinely invokes “necessity” to justify physical and sexual coercion, shielding GSS interrogators from criminal investigation and prosecution for acts of torture and sexual violence.

By Christian Bryan ’29

Posted on October 26, 2026

Ukraine and Greenland: One War, One Warning

On September 22, 2026, the United States signed a deal to expand its military presence in Greenland, a NATO member through its tie to Denmark, and one of seven Arctic countries in the alliance. Russia is the only arctic nation that isn’t a NATO member, and has expressed feeling threatened by the alliance surrounding it.

The deal plans to add two American defense sites at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig alongside Greenland’s existing missile-warning base. This would strengthen the alliance’s surveillance of the coast and provide it with technology capable of spotting missile launches early and more precisely tracking Russian submarines.

In February, NATO launched the Arctic Sentry initiative to coordinate exercises and surveillance across the north, with Finland and Sweden joining the alliance extending its reach towards Russia.

The Russia-NATO division is why the repercussions of this agreement could stretch far beyond Greenland, because every NATO base in the Arctic is one more reason Russia will claim it feels threatened by. Since the alliance promises to defend any members under attack, a clash at any outpost could force countries across Europe and North America into the same crisis. Although the repercussions seem distant now, they are already starting to emerge. In April 2026, Britain and Norway spent more than a month tracking a Russian attack submarine in the waters north of the UK.

With nuclear weapons on both sides, even a conflict neither side wants could begin through miscalculation, and this has happened even as recently as the Cold War. Russia has already shown the world how seriously it treats NATO’s presence near its borders: after years of calling their presence intolerable, it used it as an illegitimate reason to invade Ukraine in 2022, launching the largest war Europe has seen in generations. The Arctic is now becoming a similar frontier, and Greenland sits front and center. Russia once called NATO’s presence unjustified and Ukraine paid the price. Could the Arctic become the next place where that fear turns into “justification” for war?

By Alana Montembault ’29

Posted on October 26, 2026

Regional Security and Tensions in the Middle East: Trump and Netanyahu’s Involvement Risks Civilian Protections

The Middle East is once again confronting a familiar question: Does military escalation promote security, or does it guarantee another round of violence? Egypt’s recent pledge to support Saudi Arabia against Houthi attacks illustrates how quickly regional conflicts can expand, drawing neighboring states into larger geopolitical rivalries. Rather than treating this escalation as an isolated crisis, it should be seen as a warning about the consequences of a regional order increasingly organized around military superiority.

Saudi Arabia has credible concerns to defend its population and infrastructure against missile and drone attacks. Houthi strikes on vulnerable areas cannot be dismissed as acceptable resistance. Yet, defending Saudi sovereignty should not require accepting a cycle of retaliation. Egypt’s potential military involvement would raise tensions and risk a bigger confrontation without resolving the conflict.

The United States and Israel must also confront their role in this deteriorating security environment. Under President Trump, Washington’s close allyship with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu reinforced an approach to regional security that encourages military pressure against Iran. Netanyahu’s public relationship with Trump reflects the importance of U.S. support to Israel. But when Washington and Israel frame security primarily through domination, neighboring countries are left to bear the consequences of the violence through war.

This is not an argument that Iran or the Houthis should be exempt from accountability. Iran’s support for armed groups, some which attack civilian infrastructure, deserves criticism. However, condemning Iranian influence while ignoring the damaging effects of American and Israeli military decisions would apply international principles in an unfair and selective manner. No government should claim that its security concerns justify actions that place populations at risk.

Saudi Arabia now faces an important choice. It can deepen its reliance on military partnerships and become more entrenched in them, or it could use its influence to negotiate civilian protection. Egypt and other regional governments should also be involved with a more transparent foreign policy.

Washington, meanwhile, must recognize that supporting Israel does not mean endorsing every strategy they choose. American influence would be better spent pressing for restraint, protection for civilians, and establishing more avenues for dialogue rather than proposing military superiority as a solution to conflict.

By Aashi Singh ’29

Posted on October 26, 2026

Indonesia’s Selective Solidarity

On September 19, 2026, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto led “Free Palestine” chants at Darussalam Gontor’s centenary celebration. Ten months earlier, Prabowo declared Soeharto a national hero despite opposition from human rights groups. The former dictator’s record makes this honor difficult to reconcile with Indonesia’s anti-colonial principles.

Indonesia’s solidarity with Palestine remains clear today. Former Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has even denounced the West for its “double standards” towards Gaza. Indonesians often see support for Palestine as mandated by a constitution that rejects colonialism. Indonesia holds itself to a certain standard, but by that standard, honoring Soeharto fails to meet it.

Indonesia occupied East Timor from 1975 to 1999, having invaded under Soeharto, who ruled until 1998. Research for East Timor’s truth commission estimated at least 102,800 conflict-related deaths between 1974 and 1999, most from hunger and illness. Soeharto also rose to power through the army-led mass killings of 1965-1966, in which at least 500,000 people were killed. Can a government truly stand by anti-colonial principles while hailing a man responsible for decades of occupation and mass violence as a national hero?

Moreover, the Indonesian government has yet to deliver meaningful judicial accountability for these atrocities. Former President Joko Widodo acknowledged past abuses and expressed regret, but recognition has not brought perpetrators to justice. Honoring Soeharto reinforces that failure by celebrating the leader for whose rule victims still seek accountability.

Indonesia also faces criticism over displacement and abuses affecting Indigenous Papuans. Advocates for West Papuan independence have called its condemnation of the State of Israel hypocritical, describing Indonesian rule as an occupation.

A state’s voice abroad can only go as far as its credibility at home. Taking a stance on an international issue is easy. But can the Indonesian state show the same courage and solidarity towards its own victims and confront Soeharto’s legacy by pursuing real accountability?

By Naufal Permana ’30

Posted on October 16, 2026

All Eyes on Brazil

Latin America’s political pendulum is, once again, swinging right. Since 2024, conservative victories in Panama, Chile, Bolivia and Honduras have reversed much of the region’s recent leftward turn. Frustration with economic stagnation, corruption, political polarization, and insecurity has reshaped the political landscape. Now, the region’s largest democracy faces an election with consequences far beyond its borders.

On October 4, Flávio Bolsonaro won 47% of Brazil’s presidential vote, narrowly ahead of incumbent Lula. His Liberal Party also expanded its representation to 28 of the Senate’s 81 seats. Four years after Jair Bolsonaro’s defeat, his movement is again within reach of the presidency.

Sure, the region’s rightward turn is not inherently a threat to democracy. Voters have every right to reject governments that fail to deliver prosperity or security. But Brazil presents a more troubling case: the political resurgence of a movement whose founder was convicted of plotting to overturn an election.

In 2023, Bolsonaro supporters stormed the National Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace. In 2025, Jair Bolsonaro was convicted for his role in a coup plot following his 2022 defeat. Yet his political influence has endured. His son now promises to pardon him if elected.

This is a central dilemma of democratic backsliding. Brazil’s institutions survived the attempted coup, but the political movement associated with it remains a major electoral force. Its return to power would test the independence of institutions that held its founder accountable.

Brazil’s importance extends beyond Latin America. As a major emerging power and a central actor in global climate diplomacy, its political direction carries international consequences. At a time when democratic institutions face mounting pressure worldwide, Brazil offers a test of their resilience.

The October 25 runoff is not just another contest between the left and right. The independence of Brazil’s courts and the principle that no one, however popular, stands above the law are at stake. For the sake of democracy far beyond Brazil’s borders, let us hope its institutions emerge stronger.

By Utku Özgür ’29, Managing Editor

Posted on October 16, 2026

What an EU “Associate Membership” Might Mean for Canada

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently discussed a proposal for Canada to become the first “associate member” of the EU. While this status doesn’t currently exist, von der Leyen called for an “Alliance for the Future” on September 16 involving defense, critical minerals, and energy security, and Carney welcomed the proposal in a speech to the European Parliament the next day. Locked in a trade war with its largest trading partner, the U.S., Canada is keen to deepen its European ties.

Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union limits membership to European states, but a closer alliance could take several forms.

First, the EU member states that have not yet done so could fully ratify the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), signed in 2016. Much of CETA has applied provisionally since 2017, but full ratification would bring its remaining provisions into force. Additionally, Canada and the EU could update CETA to reflect modern priorities and strengthen Canada’s bargaining power with the U.S.

Canada could also pursue European Free Trade Association (EFTA) membership, although all current members are European countries. A customs union would require Canada to align its external tariffs with the EU’s, limiting its independent trade policy but potentially strengthening its bargaining power with Washington.

Canada and the EU also work closely on matters beyond economics, particularly on defense. Their 2017 Strategic Partnership Agreement guides dialogue on international peace and development while the 2025 Security and Defense Partnership provides a framework for cooperation on issues including aid to Ukraine and cybersecurity. Closer integration beyond economic matters could be a viable option.

Could Canada craft a bespoke agreement to deepen cooperation on trade, security, and international development without becoming an EU member? Such a framework could reduce its dependence on the U.S. and offer a path for other non-European partners to work closely with the EU.

By Avery Griffin ’29

Posted on October 16, 2026

A Sudden Reversal: Trump Announces Deal with Russia

President Trump announced a deal with Russia allowing U.S. imports of Russian diesel, with 300,000 tons to be supplied immediately and millions more to follow in the coming months. The deal includes easing sanctions on Russian diesel for six months, allowing sales on global markets. Trump’s announcement, following a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, reverses years of sanctions imposed on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Just last month, Trump signed a sweeping sanctions law targeting Russian energy revenues. Now, the U.S. is set to help replenish them.

This contradiction in U.S. policy highlights the transactional nature of Trump’s approach to international relations. Currently, Trump and Putin’s goals are temporarily aligned: Trump wants lower fuel prices as the midterms approach, with prices still soaring because of the Iran war, and Russia’s embattled economy needs relief as it continues its war in Ukraine. However, any potential reduction in American fuel prices comes at the cost of weakening the  campaign to squeeze Russia’s economy and force an end to the war. The deal has caused another rift with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and European politicians, who have criticized it as enabling more aggression and reducing economic leverage over Russia. Despite contradicting current U.S. policy toward the war in Ukraine, in many ways the deal aligns with Trump’s belief in power politics and dealmaking over broader international rules or ideals.

If the agreement holds, it will be a welcome reprieve for Russia, but won’t necessarily lead to a fundamental change in the war. When the Iran war drove up global oil prices, Russia was expecting an economic windfall, but Ukraine’s “kinetic sanctions,” a massive drone strike campaign targeting refineries across Russia, have limited the potential benefits. Diesel production is estimated to have dropped nearly 30% and exports have been restricted as Russia faces domestic shortages. As the war has shifted further towards economic attrition over the summer and fall, each side sees a path to victory through the destruction of the other’s infrastructure and ability to sustain the war. This makes sanctions even more important as they shift Russia’s calculus.

By Julian Clemente ’27

Posted on October 16, 2026

AI Arms Race: Between Competition and Diplomacy

On September 24, the meeting between President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the White House highlighted competing approaches to global technology. While tech leaders like Elon Musk and Sam Altman attended the dinner, the discussion of artificial intelligence (AI) revealed a deep disagreement between the two countries.

The two leaders expressed very different views. Xi Jinping argued that AI should be a shared responsibility, saying that humans must always retain control over powerful AI models. Trump, however, resisted calls for shared restrictions on AI development. He argued that the U.S. is currently leading the tech race, and that pausing or slowing down would only help China win.

One outcome was an agreement to establish an AI dialogue and a communication channel for AI-related incidents. While such a channel can help manage a  crisis, it only reacts to problems after they happen. It does not create binding rules to prevent those problems from happening in the first place. This is dangerous because advanced AI models can help  automate cyberattacks.

Treating AI as a race to win risks makes global safety secondary to national advantage. Following the summit, Trump met with American tech CEOs to sign a voluntary self-regulation pledge, placing responsibility for safety largely in the hands of the companies competing to develop these systems.

Temporary trade truces or gifts of new pandas do not hide the real danger. Both Washington and Beijing are rushing to build increasingly powerful AI systems, while shared safeguards remain limited. Without binding safety commitments, this race could easily spiral out of control.

By August Oliveira ’30

Posted on October 16, 2026

China’s Gray-Zone Tactics Continue Between Summits

President Trump met President Xi at the White House on September 24. The summit produced few breakthroughs on major strategic disputes, while a Chinese readout said Xi urged the United States to oppose “Taiwan independence.” Yet the pursuit of stable relations with Washington has not halted Beijing’s pressure on the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally.

That same day, Philippine authorities accused Chinese vessels of obstructing a Philippine resupply mission in the South China Sea. Such operations exemplify gray-zone tactics: coercive actions that stay below the threshold of war while gradually changing conditions at sea. The cumulative effect of these tactics matters more than any single confrontation.

Days later, the Philippine Coast Guard accused a Chinese research vessel of spoofing its location while operating off Batanes, the Philippines’ northernmost island group, about 160 kilometers from Taiwan. On October 1, Manila sent its largest coast guard ship and an aircraft to drive the vessel away, while a Chinese coast guard ship moved to shield the research vessel. On October 4, Philippine authorities reported another obstruction near Thitu Island. These incidents are not isolated. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative recorded 933 Chinese coast guard ship-days around Scarborough Shoal in the first half of 2026, nearly matching the 1,099 recorded throughout 2025 and exceeding the 516 recorded in 2024. A growing maritime presence allows Beijing to make interference with Philippine operations increasingly routine.

Beijing describes these activities as lawful enforcement in waters it claims. But the pattern suggests summit diplomacy and regional coercion can proceed simultaneously. Beijing can cooperate with Washington where useful while continuing to assert control over disputed waters. Diplomatic engagement alone offers little reason to expect that pressure to ease.

The United States should judge stability with China by whether Chinese behavior toward U.S. allies changes between summits. Maritime coercion must be addressed within the broader relationship, including discussions of regional security. Otherwise, presidential meetings risk creating an appearance of stability while Beijing steadily changes the conditions beneath it.

By Jack Rogers ‘28

Posted on October 16, 2026

Houthi Strikes Kill Civilians and Injure Hundreds

A Houthi strike on an airport in Riyadh killed 12 people and injured more than 300, marking the third attack on Saudi Arabian airports this week. UN Secretary-General António Guterres condemned the strike, stating that it violated international law.

The conflict, which is connected to the wider Iran crisis, has displaced more than 200,000 people. Saudi Arabia’s civil aviation authority reported that 309 people were injured in the strike, some critically. Yemen’s vice president responded to the recent wave of attacks by calling for immediate direct action.

The attack was carried out using missiles and drones, consistent with the Houthis’ previous methods. Reports also described a strike on King Khalid International Airport that killed one person and injured dozens.

The Houthis stated that their attack targeted Saudi military supplies at Badr camp. They maintained that the missiles were intended for the camp and that hitting civilian airports was accidental. However, tensions had escalated sharply before the strike. A Saudi-Yemeni coalition had reportedly taken control of Bab el-Mandeb, a key shipping passage. This development provides context for the attack, although the Houthis’ motives remain unclear.

By Teddy Berghammer ’29

Posted on October 16, 2026

Migration Management and Mixed Signals: Costa Rica’s Acceptance of U.S. Deportees

Imagine travelling to a friend’s house, maybe because your parents have been having intense arguments and home no longer feels like home. Now imagine this friend’s parents turning you away at the door, instead forcing you to stay at a stranger’s house. The discomfort is obvious.

This situation is not unlike what is happening today with immigrants from across the globe who have come to the US only to be deported to Costa Rica, under a third-country agreement associated with the Shield of the Americas initiative. The Trump administration, pursuing heightened levels of deportation, turned to Costa Rica, a less powerful partner apparently aligned with its interests, raising questions about the terms of migration cooperation.

The agreement represents more than a search  for more space. Costa Rica has accepted an agreement bringing foreign migrants onto its own soil, which, given the nation’s longstanding humanitarian commitments, has given rise to legal and political concerns. The nation itself has entered an internal disagreement surrounding the implications of this new agreement in relation to its current statutes and constitution, with prominent public figures questioning the treatment of the deportees and the agreement’s constitutionality.

The growing complexity of migration management has raised significant questions regarding power asymmetry and national sovereignty. Countries such as Costa Rica see their populations divided over agreements that call their national identity into question, particularly when government commitments appear to conflict with constitutional principles or humanitarian ideals.

This raises the question of whether agreements involving nations with vastly different  resources and bargaining power should be considered equitable given their implications for the affected nation’s population and constitutional commitments. The rights of these deportees are being disregarded. They are unable to return home, they are placed in a constantly changing environment and they are expected to submit to the authority of whatever government they are handed to.

By August Medrano ’30

Posted on October 16, 2026

How Indonesia’s Surplus Reveals an Underlying Issue in its Economy

In August 2026, Indonesia posted a shocking $3.55 billion trade surplus according to London Stock Exchange Group, significantly surpassing Reuters’ predicted poll of a $635 million surplus. Though this growth initially ameliorated Indonesian concerns over their trade balance, the country’s growth reveals how geopolitical shocks pose underlying problems to economic stability. 

In May of this year, Indonesia reported a high deficit of $1.6 billion, due to high oil prices. While Indonesia is a producer of oil, it imports much more than it exports, making up a total of 15% of imports domestically. In response to the higher oil prices, Indonesia’s commodity prices rose, evidenced by the lack of change in the amount exported, but the deficit shrinking in the months following it. Nickel and its derivatives, a significant component of Indonesia’s exports, saw their export value rise about 21% this year. The imports of oil and the exports of nickel are two incredibly important and significant components of the trade of Indonesia, revealing a continued underlying reliance on a volatile commodity like oil, which is vulnerable to geopolitical events as evidenced in May of this year.

However, Bank Indonesia (Indonesia’s Central Bank) states that the surplus is a positive for strengthening the country’s external economic resilience. The country’s number of manufacturing exports has risen by 12.5%, which is an important signal that the country’s internal structure is improving. Additionally, nickel has been on a long-term trajectory for growth, which could explain why Indonesia bounced back from the trade deficit. While Bank Indonesia’s claims are credible, one month of data isn’t enough to indicate growth—especially after such a huge shock to the trade balance. 

Indonesia mainly trades with the two major powers in Asian trade, India and China. Exporting commodities like nickel is a vital asset to the Indonesian economy, but with Indonesia’s continued reliance on oil as their primary imports, it still raises a significant question towards the economic stability of the country. Until Indonesia has this energy security, this good month is simply a windfall, not a shift.

By Syon Kaustuv ’30

Posted on October 12, 2026

How the Results of Israel’s Upcoming Election Could Delay Settlement Development

On October 27, 2026, Israel will hold its first Knesset elections since 2022. A prime minister and coalition government each require at least 61 of the Knesset’s 120 votes. Netanyahu has been prime minister since December 2022, but polls predict anti-Netanyahu parties led by Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar party will reach 61 seats.

If elected, we can expect Eisenkot to perpetuate the Palestinian genocide much as Netanyahu has. However, a silver lining for Palestinians is that Eisenkot would likely delay E1 settlement development.

E1 is a stretch of the Israeli occupied West Bank where proponents of the E1 plan propose over 3,400 settlement units be built to connect East Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim (an illegal Israeli settlement). Approved on August 20, 2025, largely through Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s efforts, Israel is currently accepting contractor applications, with grants scheduled after the election. The E1 plan is legally invalid and morally abhorrent; most of the world considers the plan to be illegal under international law (Israel denies this), and the plan would end the possibility of a two-state solution and displace an estimated 3,700-7,000 Palestinians.

Eisenkot would likely delay E1 for three reasons. First, when asked about his position on E1, he replied, “Not now. It is a mistake that comes at an international cost.” Although “now” suggests eventual development, we can take him at his word because those costs are real and escalating.

Second, international pressure is growing: the UK banned settlement goods and sanctioned extremist settlers (including Smotrich); Canada, France, Spain, and others pledged to restrict settlement trade; and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas called for an EU-wide ban.

Third, proponents of the E1 plan are unlikely to successfully pressure Eisenkot into acting. This is because his four-party coalition is split on the issue: Yashar and The Democrats oppose E1, while Bennett’s Together and Liberman’s Israel Our Home support it.

Given his stated position, rising international pressure, and a divided coalition, Eisenkot will likely delay E1 settlement development if elected.

By Christian Bryan ’29

Posted on October 10, 2026

Who Pays the Price for the Inevitable 1.5°C Overshoot?

Europe Has the Capacity. Does It Have the Will?