Civil Society and Its Impacts on U.S. Security Policy Toward China

By Jacinta Chen

With the recent escalation of the United States-China trade war, China’s human rights abuses of the Uighur minority, and President Trump’s accusations of Chinese meddling in the midterm elections, the U.S. public has turned its attention toward the U.S.’s economic relationship with China. Though the general public seems to have lackluster concern for security policy toward China, lobbyists working for the Taiwanese government have pressured the Trump administration into expanding diplomatic dialogue and increasing arms sales. There is also a community of conservative foreign policy strategists from think tanks, such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage Foundation (HF), who are pushing the U.S. to take a harder line in response to China’s economic expansion through the Belt and Road Initiative and its military development in the South China Sea.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines in July 2016. However, Beijing has continued to intimidate U.S. allies in the South China Sea into accepting its claims of sovereignty by increasing military activity. China has poured massive amounts of resources into fortifying its artificial island bases, including the Paracel, Woody, and Spratly Islands, with fighter jets, cruise missiles and even a radar system.

After announcing the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China has financed numerous infrastructure projects in 65 countries “that account collectively for over 30% of global GDP, 62% of population, and 75% of known energy reserves,” according to the World Bank. This form of diplomatic aid is perceived as an expansionist threat that gives Beijing leverage over many developing countries.

The U.S. seeks to conduct freedom of navigation operations (FNOPs), secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs), prevent military escalation, and maintain its hegemonic role in the South China Sea. In light of these security interests and pressure from lobbyists and interest groups, the U.S. has bolstered its regional allies, increased its military presence, expanded military spending, and developed its own diplomatic aid program.

Research conducted by PEW earlier this year reveals that the trend of U.S. attitudes from 2012, which suggested growing American concern for China’s military strength, reversed in 2016. In Spring 2018, 58% of Americans said they were more concerned with China’s economic strength compared to the 29% who claimed to be more worried about its military strength.

In particular, 89% of the U.S. public perceive China’s possession of U.S. debt to be a serious problem and 87% consider Chinese cyberattacks a serious issue. Only 22% of the public has very serious concerns (and 41% have somewhat serious concerns) regarding tensions between Taiwan and China. It is also safe to assume the U.S. public does not prioritize China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors in the South China Sea, given only 34% consider it a very serious problem.

Along party lines, PEW’s study shows that Democrats were most concerned with China’s disregard for human rights and the environment. Meanwhile, Republicans were focused on the loss of U.S. jobs due to Chinese outsourcing, the U.S. debt held by China, and Chinese cyberattacks.

Although the Trump administration’s implementation of a new initiative to combat economic espionage reflects one of the U.S. public’s biggest security concerns, it is clear that the administration’s other security policies stem from influences outside the average American’s concerns.

Even though public opinion focuses less on China-Taiwan relations, Taipei has spent US$3.32 million in 2017 (more than double the $1.63 million spent by Beijing) on service agreements with four lobbying firms, including the Gephardt Group, the Nickles Group, Alston & Bird, and the Daschle Group.

In direct response to Beijing’s military and diplomatic aggression toward Taiwan, lobbying efforts have resulted in the Trump administration’s establishment of the Taiwan Travel Act, which encourages visits from high-level Taiwanese officials, in March 2018. Alston & Bird lobbyist Bob Dole planned the protocol-breaking phone call with Taiwanese President Tsai over four months, while the Daschle Group pressured the Trump administration into approving a US$1.42 billion arms sale to Taiwan in June 2017.

The Taiwanese government has even considered a US$360,000 one-year contract with a fifth lobby group, Potomac International Partners, which would work to secure a bilateral free trade agreement, push for even more regular arms sales, and establish a national security partnership that would require the U.S. to condemn China’s military activity in the South China Sea.

Beyond the Taiwan lobby, a series of prominent think tanks are pushing the U.S. to take a harder line on China. These policy experts have close ties to the White House and are frequently quoted in the media. Scholars of these think tanks, including those of the AEI, often present research and policy recommendations for policy on China before various Senate and House intelligence and foreign relations committees.

The AEI and the Brookings Institution have advised the Trump administration to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the global exercise of political freedom. This passive political warfare would force China to re-allocate resources from external expansion to containing internal instability. Even with the State Department’s annual release of human rights reports, past administrations have not taken a very hard line on the China’s human rights abuses and it seems unlikely that the Trump administration will do this, considering President Trump’s track record on human rights. It is possible that the extensive coverage on the violation of Uighurs’ rights in the media as well as pressure from human rights activists and evangelical Christian groups in favor of religious freedom may push Washington to take some action against Chinese officials. However, China’s other human rights abuses, including censorship and arbitrary detention, will likely remain uncondemned in the public sphere.

Scholars of the AEI, the Center for New American Security (CNAS), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have argued that Beijing threatens the world with attempts to establish powerful spheres of influence, rigged economic interactions, and authoritarianism. They predict that Beijing is using the Belt and Road Initiative to suit Chinese needs, specifically by gaining leverage over developing countries such as Kenya and Indonesia that will not be able to repay China for financing their infrastructure projects.

Many of these think tanks have recommended the Trump administration to establish a diplomatic aid program as an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative. This pressure has prompted the Trump administration to deviate from its “America First” approach. In October, President Trump signed into law a new agency, which merges the existing Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Development Credit Authority, to encourage American private sector investment in developing countries.

To further contain the threat of China’s spread, the AEI and the Brookings Institution have suggested cultivating new economic partnerships with Vietnam, Indonesia, and India. As China extends its economic influence to other nations’ shores, these think tanks have advised Washington to reaffirm its commitment to supporting the economies of pre-existing allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, and Singapore.

In addition to advocating for increased monetary support, think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation, have supported the U.S.’s continued continued regional military presence through FNOPs, Since they have called upon Washington to conduct more bilateral military operations with regional partners, discussions in the past year have indicated a policy shift toward more frequent military exercises with current allies, including the Philippines.

Jacinta Chen PO ’21 is majoring in politics and minoring in history. She is involved in the Pomona-Pitzer Varsity Women’s Tennis Team, Pomona College Academy for Youth Success College Advising Pro- gram, The Student Life and Claremont Captures. She is interested in U.S. foreign policy, Asia-Pacific region and international law; and has assisted research on the U.S. response to the Arab Spring.


References

American Enterprise Institute: http://www.aei.org/publication/testimony-chinas-worldwide-military-expansion/, https://www.aei.org/publication/testimony-cooperation-and-competition-with-china-the-need-for-new-approaches/

Brookings Institution: https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-framework-for-u-s-policy-toward-china-2/

Center for New American Security: https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/power-play

Center for Strategic and International Studies: https://www.csis.org/analysis/defusing-south-china-sea-disputes

CNN: https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/01/politics/china-stealing-trade-secrets/index.html

Council on Foreign Relations: https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?marker=22#!/conflict/territorial-disputes-in-the-south-china-sea

Foreign Policy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/08/trump-reaches-for-checkbook-diplomacy-to-counter-china/

Heritage Foundation: https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/national-strategy-the-south-china-sea, https://www.heritage.org/homeland-security/commentary/wanted-strategy-limit-chinas-grand-plans-the-south-china-sea

PEW Global Research: http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/08/28/as-trade-tensions-rise-fewer-americans-see-china-favorably/

South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2160278/taiwan-may-ramp-us-lobbying-effort-increase-arms-sales

World Bank: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative

Leave a comment